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Both China and the EU have attempted to form strong relationships with African countries over
recent years, but how do citizens within these countries view China and the EU as development
partners? Floor Keuleers presents survey evidence from a number of diﬀerent countries in Africa.
She notes that while views of the EU are positive in most cases, there is no evidence that the EU is
seen as a better development partner than China overall.
In recent years, few aspects of the European Union’s relations with Africa have sparked quite as
much academic and media interest as the challenges posed by China’s increasing presence on the
continent. In addition to concerns of a more economic and strategic nature, attention has focused on a ‘competition
for the hearts and minds’ taking place between so-called emerging and traditional donors. China, it is said, oﬀers a
credible alternative model of development – and it is sparing no public diplomacy eﬀorts in order to curry the favour
of ordinary Africans.
How successful has this Chinese ‘charm oﬀensive’ been? And does the EU need to worry about waning popularity
as a development partner for Africa? So far, the answers given to these questions have been largely anecdotal,
leading to widely diverging conclusions. A more systematic examination of how the EU and China are perceived by
African publics is therefore warranted.
Solid cross-country data on African public opinion is relatively hard to come by, but several sources do nevertheless
oﬀer very interesting insights. In 2008, the Afrobarometer Survey asked 26,513 Africans in 19 countries across the
continent about their evaluation of diﬀerent development partners. China and the EU were among the players
included, through the question: “In your opinion, how much do each of the following do to help your country, or
haven’t you heard enough to say?”
A ﬁrst interesting ﬁnding concerns the proportion of respondents who felt they knew enough about the EU and China
to be able to answer the question. As Table 1 illustrates, China’s contribution was more well-known than that of the
EU in 17 out of 19 countries, and it scored considerably higher than the EU for all respondents taken together. This
is all the more notable given that 2008 was fairly early on in the exponential growth of Chinese engagement, and it
does shed new light on the EU’s proﬁle as a traditional and well-established development partner.
Table 1: Respondents who felt they knew enough about the EU/China to evaluate their contribution to
development (%)
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Source: Authors own calculations based upon
Afrobarometer Round 4 (N=26,513)
Being well-known does not of course equal being popular:
quite the contrary in many cases. However, when we look at
the actual evaluations by respondents, it appears that the EU
and China are seen in a similarly positive light. Across all
nineteen countries, 36.8 per cent of respondents gave China
the most positive score (‘helps a lot’). This indicator stood at
a very similar 37.8 per cent for the EU. The scores for the EU
and China did lie further apart more in some of the individual
countries, as shown in Table 2.
Table 2: Respondents according the most positive and
the most negative scores to the EU/China (%)
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Source: Authors own calculations based upon Afrobarometer Round 4 (N=18,424 for China
and N=16,320 for the EU)
Delving a bit deeper into how individual respondents gave evaluations, it is interesting to see that around two thirds
of respondents (59.13 per cent) accorded the same score to the EU and China. Instances in which one player was
rated much more positively or negatively than the other were quite rare. It appears, therefore, that African public
opinion is not characterised by the antagonism that pervades many academic and media accounts on the topic of
emerging versus traditional donors. This could indicate two things: either the approaches of the EU and China are
not seen as very diﬀerent by Africans, or they are seen as diﬀerent but complementary rather than mutually
exclusive. Further research and more in-depth data collection is needed to shed light on this.
One way of gaining more insights into why respondents answer in the ways they do is to look at how evaluations of
China and Africa relate to other characteristics and attitudes of respondents. A multilevel analysis of the
Afrobarometer data shows that respondents who see democracy as one of the top three priorities for their
government have a stronger preference for the EU over China than those who do not. The same is true for
respondents who attach greater importance to civil-political human rights and for respondents living in countries with
less democratic regimes. This appears to indicate that the more abstract development discourses of the EU and
China do inﬂuence African perceptions, and that there is some recognition of the EU’s focus on normative concerns.
Finally, given the fact that the Afrobarometer data was collected only once and several years ago, it is useful to have
a look at a second dataset that allows for investigating changes in public opinion over time. Among European
commentators who look less favourably upon China’s African engagement, there appears to be some optimism that
any popularity China has gained will be short-lived. Once negative eﬀects of its activities become apparent, the
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argument goes, African public opinion will turn against China.
The annual Global Attitudes Survey conducted by the Pew Research Center is very useful in this respect. The
survey asks respondents if they “have a very favourable, somewhat favourable, somewhat unfavourable, or very
unfavourable opinion” of a range of countries and actors. The evidence that Pew collected from 2007 until 2013 in
Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa does not support the hypothesis of China’s decreasing popularity (see the ﬁgure
below). The proportion of respondents with a favourable or very favourable opinion of China ﬂuctuated in all three
countries, but there is no sign of a consistent decline. In addition, China is certainly not faring worse than the EU in
this respect.
Figure: Proportion of respondents with a favourable opinion of China, the EU and the US (2007-2013)
Kenya
Nigeria
South Africa
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Note: Kenya was not surveyed in 2008 and 2012; Nigeria was not surveyed in 2011 and 2012;
South Africa was only surveyed in 2007, 2008 and 2013. Source: Author’s own calculations
based upon Pew Research Center 2007-2013 (N=798-1,128 per country per year)
To summarise, the available empirical evidence indicates that African public opinion does not put the European
Union on a pedestal as a special or better development partner. In contrast, the EU still seems to be struggling in
terms of visibility and being known among African populations. Its contribution to development is evaluated
positively, but so is China’s. Nor is there evidence that China’s popularity rose to an initial high but is now starting to
falter. Contrary to what it might believe or hope, the EU does not appear to be a privileged development partner of
Africans.
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